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ARTICLE
Modular network for high-rate quantum
conferencing
Carlo Ottaviani 1, Cosmo Lupo2, Riccardo Laurenza3 & Stefano Pirandola 1,4
One of the main open problems in quantum communication is the design of efﬁcient
quantum-secured networks. This is a challenging goal, because it requires protocols that
guarantee both unconditional security and high communication rates, while increasing the
number of users. In this scenario, continuous-variable systems provide an ideal platform
where high rates can be achieved by using off-the-shelf optical components. At the same
time, the measurement-device independent architecture is also appealing for its feature of
removing a substantial portion of practical weaknesses. Driven by these ideas, here we
introduce a modular design of continuous-variable network where each individual module is a
measurement-device-independent star network. In each module, the users send modulated
coherent states to an untrusted relay, creating multipartite secret correlations via a gen-
eralized Bell detection. Using one-time pad between different modules, the network users
may share a quantum-secure conference key over arbitrary distances at constant rate.
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Q
uantum communication1–3 with continuous variables
(CV) systems4–6 has attracted increasing attention over
the past years. In particular, quantum key distribution
(QKD) has been a rapidly developing ﬁeld7. Theoretical studies
have considered one-way protocols with coherent states8–10,
thermal protocols11–16, and two-way protocols17–21, with a
number of experimental demonstrations22–32. It is known that
CV-QKD protocols may achieve very high rates. As a matter of
fact, ideal coherent-state protocols9 may achieve rates as high as
half of the Pirandola-Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi bound33,34 for
private communication over a lossy channel, i.e., log2ð1 ηÞ
bits per use, with η being the channel transmissivity (see ref. 35 for
a recent review on bounds for private communication).
In addition to point-to-point protocols, there has been effort
towards network implementations36–38. An important step is the
design of a scalable QKD network whose rate is high enough to
compete with the classical infrastructure. Another feature to
achieve is an end-to-end architecture where middle nodes may be
untrusted. The ﬁrst steps in this direction were moved in 2012
with the introduction of a swapping protocol based on an
untrusted relay39,40, a technique that became known as “mea-
surement-device independence” (MDI), and recently extended to
CV-QKD41–46. However, until today, MDI protocols have been
limited to a small number of remote users, e.g., 2 in ref. 39, and 3
in ref. 47.
In this work we remove these limitations. In particular, we
introduce a modular architecture that combines trusted and
untrusted nodes, as well as quantum and classical communication
methods, allowing secure quantum conferencing among an
arbitrary number of users. At the core of our design there are
MDI star-network modules, interconnected by shared nodes,
which can run one-time pad protocols between different modules.
Each module consists of a central (untrusted) relay performing a
general N-mode Bell detection that allows an arbitrary number of
users to share the same quantum conference key. The security of
the protocol is ﬁrst proven in the asymptotic limit of many signals
exchanged, and then extended to the composable setting which
incorporates ﬁnite-size effects. This modular design is scalable,
because it allows us to increase arbitrarily the number of users
and the achievable distance between them, while maintaining a
high and constant rate. Moreover, it can be implemented using
linear optical elements, and it allows to add extra modules
resorting just on classical communication protocols. From this
point of view the scheme is very ﬂexible and represents a good
prototype to be developed into a large scale CV-QKD network.
Results
Modular network for quantum conferencing. In our modular
architecture (see Fig. 1), each individual module is a star network
running a multipartite MDI-QKD quantum conferencing proto-
col based on the generalization of symmetric CV-MDI-QKD43.
Each star-network module Mi is labeled by i ¼ 1; ¼ ;N? and
hosts Ni users. The generic user k in module Mi sends bright
coherent states4 jαiki to a central untrusted relay, whose ampli-
tude αik is Gaussianly modulated with variance μ
i
k. With no loss of
generality we may assume that μik is the same for any k, so that we
may associate a single variance parameter μi to module Mi. The
eavesdropping is assumed to be performed by entangling clon-
ers7, so that the link connecting the arbitrary user k to the relay in
module Mi is described by two parameters: the transmissivity η
i
k
of the link, and its thermal noise nik.
Within module Mi the untrusted relay performs a multipartite
Bell detection on the incoming Ni modes; this consists of a
suitable cascade of beam-splitters followed by Ni homodyne
detections, as shown in Fig. 2. The homodynes on the left
measure quadratures q^2; ¼ ; q^Ni , while the single one on the right
measures p^. The outcomes of the measurements are combined
into the global outcome γi :¼ ðq2; ¼ ; qNi ; pÞ. After γi is broad-
cast to the users of the module, their individual variables αik share
correlations that can be post-processed into a secret key Ki via
classical error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation. All the users
in module Mi reconcile their data with respect to a trusted user
which is shared with another module Mj.
To reduce the parameters of the problem we may introduce the
minimum transmissivity ηi ¼ mink2½1;Ni ηik and maximum ther-
mal noise ni ¼ maxk2½1;Ni nik associated to module Mi. From a
physical point of view this is a symmetrization of the star network
to the worst-case scenario, assuming all its links to have the worst
combination of parameters. This condition clearly provides a
lower bound Kðμi;Ni; ηi; niÞ to the actual key rate Ki of the
module. By optimizing over the Gaussian modulation, we may
consider the value KðNi; ηi; niÞ :¼ maxμiKðμi;Ni; ηi; niÞ. Once
each module has generated its key, the shared nodes run sessions
of one-time pad where the keys from different modules are
composed to generate a common key for all the network, with
rate
Knet ¼ min
i2½1;N?
KðNi; ηi; niÞ: ð1Þ
Therefore, the entire network can work at the rate of the least
performing module. However, if this rate is high then the lego-
like structure of the network allows all the users to communicate
at the same high rate no matter how far they are from each other
(see Fig. 1).
Detailed description the MDI star-network module. In this
section we describe the modus operandi of a single module. To
simplify the notation we omit the label i. In a single module, we
consider an arbitrary number N of users (or “Bobs”) sending
Gaussian-modulated coherent states |αk〉 to a middle untrusted
relay, as depicted in Fig. 2. Each of the coherent states is affected
M i
M3
M2
M1
Fig. 1 Modular network for secure quantum conferencing. Each module Mi
is a continuous-variable (CV) measurement-device-independent (MDI)
quantum key–distribution (QKD) star network, composed by a central
untrusted relay and Ni trusted users, whose connections are independently
affected by loss and noise. Each module Mi ﬁrst runs an independent
protocol of quantum conference key-agreement. Because two different
modules have a shared trusted user, we may implement classical one-time
pad sessions where the keys from each module are processed into a ﬁnal
common key for the entire network
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by a thermal-loss channel E modeled as a beam-splitter with
transmissivity η and thermal noise n, i.e., mixing the incoming
signal with an environmental thermal state with n mean photons.
As explained before, we assume the worst-case scenario, so that η
is the minimum transmissivity of the links and n is the maximum
thermal noise. After the action of the channel E on each link, the
states are detected by a multipartite N-mode Bell detection.
This detection consists of a suitable cascade of beam-splitters
followed by N homodyne detections. More precisely, we have a
sequence of beam-splitters with increasing transmissivities
Tk= 1− k−1 for k= 2, …, N as depicted in Fig. 2. Then, all
the homodynes at the left measure the q^-quadrature while the
ﬁnal one at the bottom measures the p^-quadrature, with global
outcome γ : = (q2, …, qN, p) (see Supplementary Notes 1 and 2
for further description). One can check that this measurement
ideally projects onto a displaced version of an asymptotic bosonic
state Ψ that realizes the multipartite Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) conditions
PN
k¼1 p^k ¼ 0 and q^k  q^k′ ¼ 0 for any k, k′ = 1,
…, N.
After the classical outcome γ is broadcast to the users, their
individual variables αk will share correlations which can be post-
processed into secret keys via error correction and privacy
ampliﬁcation. We may pick the shared trusted user as the one
encoding the key, with all the others decoding it in direct
reconciliation7.
Entanglement-based representation. Let us write the network in
entanglement-based representation. For each user, the coherent
state |α〉 can be generated by using a two-mode squeezed vacuum
(TMSV) state ΦAB where mode B is subject to heterodyne
detection. The random outcome β of the detection is fully
equivalent to prepare a coherent state on mode A whose ampli-
tude α is one-to-one with β41. Recall that a TMSV state is a
Gaussian state with covariance matrix (CM)4
VAB ¼
μI
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
μ2  1p Zﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
μ2  1p Z μI
 !
;
Z :¼ diagð1;1Þ;
I :¼ diagð1; 1Þ;

ð2Þ
where parameter μ ≥ 1 quantiﬁes the noise variance of each
thermal mode. Up to factors41, parameter μ also provides the
variance of the Gaussian modulation of the coherent amplitude α
on mode A after heterodyning B.
Assume that the users have N copies of the same TMSV state,
whose A-part is sent to the relay through a communication
channel E. Also assume that the CM of the two-mode state after
the channel has the form
V′AB ¼
xI zZ
zZ yI
 
: ð3Þ
Because we consider a thermal-loss channel with transmissivity
η and thermal noise n, we have x ¼ ημþ ð1 ηÞð2nþ 1Þ, y = μ,
and c ¼ ﬃﬃﬃηp ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃμ2  1p . Then, after the Bell measurement and the
communication of the outcome γ, the local modes B := B1…BN
are projected onto a symmetric N-mode Gaussian state with CM
VBjγ ¼
Δ Γ    Γ
Γ Δ
.
.
.
Γ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Γ Γ    Δ
0
BBBBB@
1
CCCCCA; ð4Þ
where we have set Γ := (N−1x−1z2)Z, and
Δ :¼ diag y  N  1
N
z2
x
; y  1
N
z2
x
 
: ð5Þ
Details on the the derivation of Eq. (4) are given in the
Supplementary Note 2.
Note that the conditional state ρBiBjjγ between any pair of Bobs i
and j is Gaussian with CM
VBiBjjγ ¼
Δ Γ
Γ Δ
 
: ð6Þ
For N= 2 this state describes the shared state in a standard CV-
MDI-QKD protocol41. Assuming no thermal noise ðn ¼ 0Þ, the
state ρBiBjjγ is always entangled and we may compute its relative
entropy of entanglement (REE) ERðρB1B2jγÞ48–50 using the formula
for the relative entropy between Gaussian states33,51. This REE
provides an upper bound to the rate achievable by any MDI-QKD
protocol (DV or CV) based on a passive untrusted relay. For N >
2, one can check that the bipartite state ρBiBjjγ may become
separable when we decrease the transmissivity η, while it certainly
remains discordant52–54. In the multi-user scenario, the security
between two Bobs may still hold because the puriﬁcation of their
state is held partially by Eve and partially by the other Bobs,
which play the role of trusted noise. In trusted noise QKD we
know that security does not rely on the presence of bipartite
entanglement while quantum discord provides a necessary
condition55.
Key rate of a star-network module. Once γ is received, the ith
Bob heterodynes his local mode Bi with random outcome βi,
which is one-to-one with an encoded amplitude αi in the prepare
and measure description. In this way the local mode Bj of the jth
Bob is mapped into a Gaussian state ρBjjγβi with CM VBjjγβi that
can be computed using tools from refs. 4,56–58. The subsequent
heterodyne detection of mode Bj generates an outcome βj which is
one-to-one with an encoded αj. It is clear that the Bell detection at
T2
T3
TN
p
q2
q3
qN
Bob1|1〉
Bob2|2〉
Bob3|3〉
BobN|N〉
Thermal-loss
channels
Untrusted
relay
Fig. 2 Each Bob sends a Gaussian-modulated coherent state αkj i to an
untrusted relay through a link which is described by a thermal-loss channel
E with transmissivity η and thermal noise n. At the relay, the incoming
states are subject to a multipartite continuous-variable (CV) Bell detection,
by using a cascade of beam-splitters with transmissivities Tk= 1− k
−1 for
k= 2, …, N, followed by homodyne detectors in the q^ or p^ quadrature as
shown in the ﬁgure. The global outcome γ= (q2,…, qN,p) is broadcast to
the Bobs, so that a posteriori correlations are created in their local variables
α1,…, αN. These correlations are used to extract a secret key for quantum
conferencing
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the relay and the local heterodyne meaurements of the various
Bobs all commute, so that we may change their time order in the
security analysis of the protocol. Thus, we can derive the mutual
information I(βi : βj) between the two Bobs. Similarly, we may
compute the Holevo information χ(βi : E) between the ith Bob
and an eavesdropper (Eve) performing a collective Gaussian
attack59–61 associated with the thermal-loss channels4.
The expression K = I(βi : βj)− χ(βi : E), which is a function of
all the parameters of the protocol, provides the asymptotic rate of
secret key generation between any pair of users (see Supplemen-
tary Note 3). This is a conferencing key shared among all Bobs; it
can be optimized over μ, and will depend on the number of Bobs
N besides the channel parameters η and n. Assuming a standard
optical ﬁber with attenuation of 0.2 dB per km, we can map the
transmissivity into a ﬁber distance d, using η := 10−0.02d.
Therefore, we have a rate of the form Kðμ;N; d; nÞ which can
be optimized over μ to give the maximal conferencing rate
KðN; d; nÞ. The maximization over μ is required because for N > 2
the maximum rate is not obtained in the limit μ  1.
The conferencing rate is plotted in Fig. 3a for an MDI star
network with an increasing number of users N. We compare the
rates over the link-distance d for different values of thermal noise
n. As expected the rate decreases for increasing N. Despite this
effect, our result shows that high-rate quantum conferencing is
possible. For instance, in a star network with N= 50 users at
d≲40m from the central relay and thermal noise n ¼ 0:05, the
key rate may be greater than ’0:1 bits per use. In Fig. 3b, we set
n ¼ 0 and plot the maximum distance for quantum conferencing
versus the number of users, solving the equation K(N, d, 0)= 0.
We see a trade-off between maximum distance and number of
users. Despite this trade-off, we conclude that ﬁber-optic secure
quantum conferencing between tens of users (belonging to a
single star-network module) is indeed feasible within the typical
perimeter of a large building.
Finite-size composable security. Within a module, consider a
pair of Bobs, i and j, with local variables βi and βj after heterodyne
detection. They aim at generating a secret key by reconciliating on
βi. The error correction routine is characterized by an error
correction efﬁciency ξ∈ (0,1)62,63, a residual probability of error
δEC, and an abort probability 1− p > 0. We also remark that βi
must be mapped into a discrete variable βi taking 2
d values per
quadrature.
Consider the mutual information I(βi : βj) and Eve’s Holevo
bound χ(βi : E) obtained from the reduced state of Eq. (6). Then,
we have the following estimate for the δ-secret key rate after n
uses of the module46
rδn ≳ ξIðβi : βjÞ  χðβi : EÞ 
1ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ΔAEPð2pδs=3; dÞ ; ð7Þ
where δ= δs+ δEC+ δPE, and ΔAEPðξ; dÞ  4ðd þ 1Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
logð2=ξ2Þ
q
.
Here the error term δs is the smoothing parameter of the smooth
conditional min-entropy46. For the Holevo bound χ(βi : E) we
assume the worst-case value compatible with the experimental
data, up to a probability smaller than δPE. The rate r
δ
n is obtained
conditioned that the protocol does not abort and yields a δ-secure
key against collective Gaussian attacks.
The generalization to coherent attacks is obtained, as in ref. 46,
by applying a Gaussian de Finetti reduction. We ﬁnd that the
asymptotic rates are approximately achieved for block sizes of
106–109 data points depending on the loss and noise in the
channels. Examples for N= 3, 5, 10 are described in Fig. 4.
The composable security analysis starts from a parameter
estimation procedure. As mentioned above, in estimating the
channel parameters, we adopt the worst-case scenario where we
choose the largest possible value of the thermal noise in each
channel, and the lower available transmissivity, within the
conﬁdence intervals. This procedure may not be optimal at high
loss, so that our estimates for the achievable communication
distances are conservative estimates. Alternative (more perform-
ing) parameter estimation procedures, as those described in
refs. 64,65,66, could be adapted to our network model and further
improve its performance.
Discussion
We have introduced a network for quantum conferencing where
modules can be linked together to achieve constant high-rate
secure communication over arbitrarily long distances. The design
of each module is based on a CV-MDI star network with many
users. Our analysis shows how the secret key-rate of each star
network decreases by increasing the distance from the central
relay and/or the number of users. In ideal conditions, we ﬁnd that
50 users may privately communicate at more than 0.1 bit per use
within a radius of 40 m, distance typical of a large building. With
a clock of 25MHz67, this is a key rate of the order of 2.5 Mbits
per second for all the users. The secret keys established in the
0.01
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Fig. 3 Secret key rates and maximum distances for quantum conferencing. aWe plot the conferencing key rate for a measurement-device-independent star
network of N= 2 (black), 10 (gray), and 50 (red) users, as a function of the ﬁber distance d and assuming thermal noise n ¼ 0 (solid curves) and n ¼ 0:05
(dashed curves). The top blue curve is the relative entropy of entanglement (REE) of the reduced bipartite state speciﬁed by Eq. (6), which upper bounds
the maximal key rate achievable with standard continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum-key-distribution CV-MDI-QKD (N= 2).
b We plot the maximum ﬁber distance d versus the number of users N in a quantum conference
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modules are then cascaded through the entire modular network:
Adjacent modules are connected by trusted users generating a
common key via one-time pad sessions.
We have studied the implementation of our protocol using
coherent states, which are important for practical reasons. In
Supplementary Note 4, we have also considered the case where
the users use squeezed states. In such a case the performance
improves, both in terms of achievable distance and the number
of users. In any case, we remark that our network protocol
provides a powerful application of CV-MDI-QKD that greatly
outperforms its DV counterpart. In fact, while our protocol is
deterministic, any linear optical implementation of a DV multi-
partite Bell detection is highly probabilistic, with a probability
of success scaling as ’2N for N users. This means that a
corresponding DV-MDI-QKD star network has an exponen-
tially low rate no matter at what distance is implemented. See
Supplementary Note 5 for details.
In Supplementary Note 6, we further analyze the performance
of the protocol based on coherent states, assuming practical
imperfections affecting the homodyne detectors and the beam
splitters of the relay. Such undesirable features may arise from
imperfect beam splitting operations, perturbing the multipartite
Bell detection and degrading the performance of the scheme. Our
results show that a proof-of-principle experiment is feasible with
current technology, allowing to secure up to 9 users per module,
over a radius of 12 m.
In conclusion, let us remark that our network is based on a
generalization of CV MDI-QKD, where the multiuser keys are
extracted within each single module. For this reason the ﬁnal key
is shorter than the private key extractable by just two remote end-
users. In other words, the key rate of our protocol cannot reach
the existing upper bounds for end-to-end network quantum
communication68,69 (see also refs. 70,71). Finally, let us also note
that additional studies may consider the multimode nature of
sources and detectors, particularly for the optimized conﬁguration
of the protocol described in the Supplementary Note 4. In such a
case, the security of the scheme can be recovered by applying the
symmetrization of the multimode source described in ref. 72.
Methods
A detailed description of methods and techniques employed to obtain the results
can be found in the Supplementary Notes accompanying this work.
Data availability
All data in this paper can be reproduced by using the methodology described.
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